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Introduction
Probably not too many physicists and philosophers of science would dis-
agree with Wolfgang Rindler’s judgment that with the development of the
Special Theory of Relativity (STR) Einstein took the step “that would com-
pletely destroy the classical concept of time.”1 Such a verdict is on the face
of it rather premature, not to say false. For by its very nature the Special
Theory is a restricted theory, since it concerns only reference frames which
are in a state of uniform motion. Although the Special Theory can be
adapted so as to analyze the notion of non-inertial (that is, accelerating or
decelerating) frames of reference, it does not serve to relativize the motion
of such frames by rendering them equivalent to inertial frames.2
Troubled by the non-equivalence of inertial and non-inertial frames,
Einstein labored for a decade on a General Theory of Relativity (GTR),
which had as its aim the enunciation of a General Principle of Relativity
which would serve to render physically equivalent all inertial and non-
inertial frames alike. After completing his General Theory in 1915, he
boasted that it “takes away from space and time the last remnant of physi-
cal objectivity.”3 It was supposed to be, in effect, the final destruction of
Newton’s absolute space and time.
In fact, however, Einstein was only partially successful in achieving his
aims. He did not succeed in enunciating a tenable General Principle of
Relativity after the pattern of the Special Principle, nor was he able to show
the physical equivalence of all reference frames. He did succeed in draft-
ing a revolutionary and complex theory of gravitation, which has been
widely hailed as his greatest intellectual achievement. The so-called




An examination of time as featured in the General Theory of Relativity, which
supercedes Einstein’s Special Theory, serves to rekindle the issue of the exis-
tence of absolute time. In application to cosmology, Einstein’s General Theory
yields models of the universe featuring a worldwide time which is the same
for all observers in the universe regardless of their relative motion. Such a cos-
mic time is a rough physical measure of Newton’s absolute time, which is
based ontologically in the duration of God’s being and is more or less accu-
rately recorded by physical clocks.
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theory of gravitation and not an extension of the Special Theory of
Relativity from inertial reference frames to all reference frames.4
The failure of Einstein’s epistemological and physical arguments aimed
at relativizing acceleration and rotation does not, however, entail the exis-
tence of Newtonian absolute space and time. For within the context of
GTR these “absolute” motions are conceived to exist, not with respect to
some absolute space and absolute time, but rather with respect to space-
time.5 Spacetime itself becomes, as Einstein saw, a sort of relativistic ether
which serves to define such motions, but is not itself a reference frame.6
Thus, although “absolute” motions — “absolute” in the sense of “non-rela-
tivized”— still exist within Relativity Theory, they do not guarantee the
existence of absolute space and time, as Newton thought.
Cosmic Time
It might appear, therefore, that GTR has nothing more to contribute to
our understanding of time than STR. The theories differ simply over the
presence of curvature in spacetime; if one adds a condition of flatness to
GTR, then STR results. But such a conclusion would be hasty, indeed, for
GTR serves to introduce into Relativity Theory a cosmic perspective,
enabling one to draft cosmological models of the universe governed by the
gravitational field equations of GTR. Within the context of such cosmolog-
ical models, the issue of time resurfaces dramatically.
Einstein himself proposed the first GTR-based cosmological model in
1917.7 The model describes a spatially finite universe which possesses at
every time t the geometry of the surface of a sphere in three dimensions
with a constant radius R. Time, which is decoupled from space, extends
from -∞ to +∞. Thus, spacetime takes on the form of a sort of four-dimen-
sional cylinder, temporal cross-sections of which are the 3-spheres. In
order to bring such a model into conformity with his field equations,
Einstein was compelled to adopt a term L, the so-called cosmological con-
stant, which counteracted gravitation and so preserved the static three-
dimensional space through time. By setting L > 0, one generates a weak
repulsion between bodies, which keeps the universe equiposed between
gravitational collapse and cosmological expansion. Kanitscheider draws
our attention to the sort of time coordinate which shows up in the metric of
Einstein’s model:
It represents in a certain sense the restoration of the universal time
which was destroyed by STR. In the static world there is a global ref-
erence frame, relative to which the whole of cosmic matter finds itself
at rest. All cosmological parameters are independent of time. In the
rest frame of cosmic matter space and time are separated. For funda-
mental observers at rest, all clocks can be synchronized and a world-
wide simultaneity can be defined in this cosmic frame.8
Thus, cosmological considerations prompted the conception of a cosmic
time which measures the duration of the universe as a whole.
Nor was this cosmic time limited to Einstein’s static model of the uni-
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verse. Expansion models, which trace their origin to de Sitter’s 1917 model
of an empty universe,9 may also involve a cosmic time. De Sitter showed
that Einstein’s field equations may be satisfied by a gravitational field in
the absence of any matter whatsoever. The de Sitter universe appears to be
static, but that is only because it is empty. If particles of matter are intro-
duced into it, one discovers that de Sitter space is in fact expanding
because the distance between any two arbitrary points increases with time
due to the repulsive force of the cosmological constant L. Thus, in 1917 two
GTR-based cosmological models had been drafted: one in which a materi-
al world exists, but is static, and another which is dynamic, but lacks a
material world — a situation which inspired Eddington’s crack: “Shall we
put a little motion into Einstein’s world of inert matter or shall we put a lit-
tle matter into de Sitter’s primum mobile?”10
In 1922 the Russian physicist Alexander Friedman combined these fea-
tures to produce a cosmological model of an expanding, material uni-
verse.11 His model universe was characterized by ideal homogeneity and
isotropy and set L = 0 (which was equivalent to omitting it, thus preserv-
ing the form of Einstein’s original equation). The most startling implica-
tion of the Friedman model is that as one traces the expansion back in time
the universe becomes increasingly dense until one arrives at a state of infi-
nite density before which the universe did not exist. Indeed, this state rep-
resents a spacetime singularity at which all spatial and temporal dimen-
sions become zero, so that it marks the boundary to physical time itself.
Cosmic time could not exist at or prior to the singularity, so that cosmic
time must be finite in the past, thereby implying a definite, finite age of the
universe. It is difficult to exaggerate how amazing such a prediction was,
for it revealed that, in the ideal case at least, the original GTR equations
implied the finitude of the past and creatio ex nihilo.
In 1930, one year after Edwin Hubble’s explanation of the observed red-
shift of galactic light as a Doppler effect due to a universal, isotropic galac-
tic recession, Eddington demonstrated that the static Einstein model was
radically unstable.12 Even small changes in the density would upset the
balance between gravitation and the cosmological constant, so that a cos-
mic expansion or collapse would result; moreover, so much as the mere
transportation of matter from one part of the universe to another would
cause the former region to expand and the latter to collapse. The following
year Einstein recommended that the cosmological constant be dropped
from the equations, later recalling it as “the greatest blunder of my life.”13
Thus, the Big Bang model of the universe—despite a later, temporary chal-
lenge from the Steady State model—came to be the controlling paradigm
of GTR-based cosmological models.
The nature of the cosmic time which measures the duration of the uni-
verse in such models deserves our scrutiny. On a very large scale, galaxies
and galactic clusters can be viewed as particles of a homogeneous and
isotropic dust or gas filling the universe. We may even choose to ignore
the particulate structure of this gas and treat it instead as an idealized, per-
fect fluid, characterized by a four-dimensional velocity u, a mass-energy
density r, and a pressure p. The 4-velocity u has reference to a hypothetical
observer who is at rest relative to the material substratum in his region and
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who therefore observes the immediately proximate galaxies to have no
mean motion. Such an observer is frequently referred to, after the manner
of E. A. Milne, as a “fundamental observer” and his associated galactic par-
ticle as a “fundamental particle.” The mass-energy density r also has refer-
ence to such a fundamental observer, being the material density and radia-
tion density of the cosmological fluid as observed by a fundamental
observer in his reference frame. The pressure p is the kinetic pressure of
the galaxies determined by both matter and radiation.
In the Friedman model, the cosmological fluid is homogeneous and
isotropic. But how are these notions to be understood? Intuitively, some-
thing is homogeneous if it is everywhere the same at a given moment of
time. But when we take a cosmological perspective, this notion necessi-
tates the existence of a cosmic time. Such a universal time can be construct-
ed by assigning a time parameter to spacelike hypersurfaces which are dis-
tinguished by natural symmetries in the spacetime. A spacelike hypersur-
face is a three-dimensional spatial slice of spacetime, the prefix “hyper-”
serving to alert us to the fact that the surfaces which dissect spacetime are
not the two-dimensional planes which appear in our diagrams, but three-
dimensional spaces. By foliating spacetime into such slices we can con-
struct a cosmic time by ordering these slices serially according to a time
parameter. The cosmic time so constructed will bear a special relationship
to the fundamental observers, whose local planes of simultaneity, calculat-
ed by the standard STR clock synchronization procedure, will fit together
to coincide with the cosmic hypersurface.14
Several features of this cosmic time deserve comment. First, although
one may slice spacetime into various hypersurfaces wholly arbitrarily, cer-
tain spacetimes have natural symmetries that guide the construction of cos-
mic time.15 GTR does not itself lay down any formula for dissecting the
spacetime manifold of points; it has no inherent “layering.” Theoretically,
then, one may slice it up at one’s whim. Nevertheless, certain models of
spacetime, like the Friedman model, have a dynamical, evolving physical
geometry, a geometry that is tied to the boundary conditions of homogene-
ity and isotropy of the cosmological fluid, and in order to ensure a smooth
development of this geometry, it will be necessary to construct a time para-
meter based on a preferred foliation of spacetime. For example, in 1935 H.
P. Robertson and A. G. Walker independently showed that a homoge-
neous and isotropic universe requires that space be possessed of a constant
curvature and be characterized by the metric:
In the metric for spacetime, the spatial geometry is dynamic over time:
dr2 + r2 (dθ2 + sin2 θdφ2)
(1 + kr2/4)2ds
2 = -dt2 + R(t)
dr2 + r2 (dθ2 + sin2 θdφ2)
(1 + kr2/4)2
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In this equation, called the Robertson-Walker line element, t represents
cosmic time, the proper time of a fundamental observer. It is detached from
space and serves to render space dynamic. The geometry of space is thus
time-dependent. The factor R(t) determines that all spatial structures of cos-
mic proportions, for example, a triangle demarcated by three galactic clus-
ters or fundamental particles, will either shrink or stretch through the con-
traction or expansion of space, in this case into a similar smaller or larger tri-
angle. The boundary condition of homogeneity precludes other geometri-
cal changes such as shear, which would preserve the area but not the shape
of the triangle. The condition of isotropy further precludes that the triangle
should be altered in such a way as to preserve both its area and shape while
nonetheless undergoing a rotational change of direction. Thus, in a
Friedman universe there are certain natural symmetries related to the
dynamic geometry which serve as markers for the foliation of spacetime
and the assigning of a cosmic time parameter. Of course, there are other
cosmological models which do not involve homogeneity and isotropy and
so may lack a cosmic time altogether.16 Cosmic time is thus not nomologi-
cally necessary, and its actual existence is an empirical question.
Secondly, cosmic time is fundamentally parameter time and only secon-
darily coordinate time.17 Physical time can be related in two quite different
ways to the manifold in which motion is represented. If it is part of that
manifold, then it functions as a coordinate. If it is external to that manifold,
then it functions as a parameter. In Newton’s physics time functioned only
as a parameter. Motion takes place in absolute space and is parameterized
by absolute time. Similarly, in Einstein’s original formulation of STR, rela-
tivistic time functions only as a parameter. The familiar spacetime formu-
lation of STR used in virtually all contemporary expositions of the theory,
according to which time is a co-ordinate (along with the three spatial co-
ordinates) of an event in spacetime, derives later from Minkowski. In the
spacetime formulation, time functions as both a co-ordinate (locating
events in the manifold) and as a parameter (recording the lapse of proper
time along an observer’s inertial trajectory), the chief difference between
the two theories being that in STR parameter time loses the universality it
possesses in Newtonian spacetime (that is, simultaneity becomes relative).
When it comes to GTR, Kroes observes that differences in coordinate time
values generally have no direct physical significance because of the vari-
able spacetime geometry or gravitational fields which distort the co-ordi-
nate grids laid on them. But insofar as time functions as a parameter in
GTR, it is a more fundamental notion of time because it does possess direct
physical significance. 18 As a parameter, cosmic time can serve as a direct
measure of the time elapsed between two events.19
Thirdly, cosmic time is intimately related to a class of fundamental
observers whose individual planes of simultaneity mutually combine to
align with the hypersurface demarcating the cosmic time.20 These hypo-
thetical observers are conceived to be moving along with the cosmological
fluid so that, although space is expanding and they are therefore mutually
receding from each other, each is in fact at rest with respect to space itself.
As time goes on and the expansion of space proceeds, each fundamental
observer remains in the same place — his spatial co-ordinates do not
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change — though his spatial separation from fellow fundamental
observers increases. Because of this mutual recession, the class of funda-
mental observers do not serve to define a global inertial frame, technically
speaking, though all of them are at rest. When each of them utilizes the
light signal method of synchronization, interesting relativistic effects arise
due to their relative recessional motion. Since the spatial distance between
them grows with time, a light signal from fundamental observer F to
another such observer F’ will have farther to travel on its return leg of its
journey than on its out-going leg (Fig. 1).
Fig. 1. Because of the distance between fundamental observers F and
F’ increases with time, a light signal will have to travel a longer dis-
tance on its return trip than on its outbound trip in an exchange
between F and F’.
F will therefore calculate that F’s clock is running slow; but, of course,
the converse is also the case. Here we have “pure relativity” without
absolute effects.21 Because F and F’ will draw their planes of simultaneity
orthogonal to their world lines, their surfaces of simultaneity will not be
aligned. But since each is at rest with respect to space, his plane of simul-
taneity will coincide locally with the hypersurface of cosmic time. Were he
in motion with respect to the cosmological fluid, then his plane of simul-
taneity would be at an angle with the local hypersurface. But in virtue of
being at rest, he can be guaranteed that local events which he judges to be
simultaneous will lie on the hypersurface. Thus, the local regions of the
planes of simultaneity of fundamental observers all blend together and
coincide with the hypersurface, much as a circle is formed by the points of
intersection of all the straight lines which are tangents of its circumference.
This has two important implications: first, that the proper time of each
fundamental observer coincides with cosmic time and, second, that all the
fundamental observers will agree as to what time it is.
One is now prepared to construct a cosmic co-ordinate time.22 The
boundary conditions of homogeneity and isotropy in Friedman models
enable fundamental observes to utilize a co-moving co-ordinate system,
which serves to define a cosmic time in which a worldwide, absolute
simultaneity exists. Deviations from this cosmic time are purely local
effects to be explained due to velocity (STR) or to gravitation (GTR). Thus,
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F F’
on a cosmic scale, we have that universality of time and absolute simul-
taneity of events which the Special Theory had denied. Whitrow asserts, “.
. . in a universe that is characterized by the existence of a cosmic time, rela-
tivity is reduced to a local phenomenon, since this time is world-wide and
independent of the observer.”23 Based on a cosmological, rather than a
local, perspective, cosmic time restores the classical notions of universal
time and absolute simultaneity which STR denied.
The question, then, becomes an empirical one: does cosmic time exist?
The answer to that question comes from the evidence for large scale (scales
of ~108 light years or larger) isotropy in the universe. The observational
evidence for cosmic isotropy, particularly for the isotropy of the cosmic
microwave background radiation, which has been measured by the COBE
satellite to an accuracy of one part in 100,000, makes it very likely that our
actual universe does approximate a Friedman universe. Martin Rees con-
cludes, “The most remarkable outcome of fifty years of observational cos-
mology has been the realization that the universe is more isotropic and
uniform than the pioneer theorists of the 1920’s would ever have suspect-
ed.”24 Consequently, “we have strong evidence that the universe as a
whole is predominantly homogeneous and isotropic,” states Whitrow,
“and this conclusion . . . is a strong argument for the existence of cosmic
time.”25 Thus, far from “taking away from space and time the last remnant
of physical objectivity,” as Einstein thought at first, GTR through its cos-
mological applications gives back what STR had purportedly removed.
Relativity theory thus gives back with its right hand what it had taken
away with its left.
God and Cosmic Time
In Newton’s view, as he explains in the Definitions and General
Scholium to his Principia, physical time is a relative measure of absolute
time, which Newton regarded as God’s time. It is plausible that since the
inception of the universe and the beginning of physical time, cosmic time
fills the role which Newton would assign to a relative measure of absolute
time. As such it registers the true time, in contrast to the multiplicity of
local times registered by clocks in motion relative to the cosmological sub-
stratum. Already in 1920, on the basis of Einstein and de Sitter’s cosmologi-
cal models, Eddington hinted at a theological interpretation of cosmic time:
In the first place, absolute space and time are restored for phenomena
on a cosmical scale . . . . The world taken as a whole has one direction
in which it is not curved; that direction gives a kind of absolute time
distinct from space. Relativity is reduced to a local phenomenon; and
although this is quite sufficient for the theory hitherto described, we
are inclined to look on the limitation rather grudgingly. But we have
already urged that the relativity theory is not concerned to deny the
possibility of an absolute time, but to deny that it is concerned in any
experimental knowledge yet found; and it need not perturb us if the
conception of absolute time turns up in a new form in a theory of
phenomena on a cosmical scale, as to which no experimental knowl-
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edge is yet available. Just as each limited observer has his own par-
ticular separation of space and time, so a being co-extensive with the
world might well have a special separation of space and time natural
to him. It is the time for this being that is here dignified by the title
‘absolute.’26
A couple of items in this remarkable paragraph deserve comment. First,
Eddington rather charitably interprets STR as positing merely an epistemic
limitation on our temporal notions rather than an ontological limitation on
time and space. But as friend and foe alike have emphasized, Einsteinian
STR requires metaphysical, not merely epistemological, commitments con-
cerning the non-existence of absolute space and time. Otherwise, one
winds up with the Lorentz-Poincaré interpretation of the theory, which is,
in truth, the position which Eddington is describing. Second, Eddington is
quite willing to call cosmic time “absolute” in view of its independence
from space, that is to say, its status as a parameter. Relativistic time is, as
Lorentz and Poincaré maintained, only a local time, whereas cosmic time,
being non-local, gives the true time. Third, although in 1920 there was no
empirical evidence for cosmic time, within a few short years astronomical
evidence confirmed the prediction of the Friedman model of a universal
expansion and, hence, of cosmic time. The veil of epistemic limitation had
been torn away by empirical science. Finally, this cosmic time would be
the time of an omnipresent being whose reference frame is the hypersur-
face of homogeneity itself. Cosmic time is not merely the “fusion” of all
the proper times recorded by the separate fundamental observers, but,
even more fundamentally, it is the time which measures the duration of the
omnipresent being which co-exists with the universe. As the measure of
the proper time of the universe, cosmic time also measures the duration of
and lapse of time for a temporal being co-extensive with the world. For
Eddington, it is the time of this being that deserves to be called “absolute.”
The theological application is obvious. If God is temporal, as Newton
believed, then it makes perfectly good sense to interpret the lapse of cosmic
time as measuring the lapse of God’s time. God’s absolute time cannot be
said to be identical with cosmic time, since absolute time could, as Newton
believed, precede physical time (imagine God’s counting down to creation).
Nevertheless, since the inception of cosmic time, the moments of cosmic
time would seem to coincide with the moments of God’s time. Since God is
causally related to the cosmos, sustaining it in being moment by moment, it
seems natural to think that the duration measured by cosmic time is also the
duration of God’s being. If the duration of the universe measured in cosmic
time is 15 billion years since the singularity, then is not the duration of
God’s creatorial activity in absolute time also 15 billion years? In God’s
“now” the universe has (present tense) certain specific and unique proper-
ties, for example, a certain radius, a certain density, a certain temperature
background, and so forth; but in the cosmic “now” it has all the identical
properties, and so it is with every successive “now.” Is it not obvious that
these “now’s” coincide and designate one and the same present?
Perhaps we can state this consideration a bit more formally by means of
the following proposed principle:
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P: For any constantly and non-recurrently changing universe U
and temporal intervals x, y large enough to permit change, if the
physical description of U at x is the same as the physical description
ofU at y, then x and y coincide.
Given that in absolute time there is a temporal interval or duration dur-
ing which a certain physical description of the universe is true and that in
cosmic time a similar interval exists, then it follows from P that those inter-
vals of absolute and cosmic time coincide. It seems to me, therefore, that if
God is temporal, God’s time and cosmic time ought naturally to be regard-
ed as coincident since the inception of cosmic time. I do not mean to say
that there are in fact two times rather than one; rather I mean simply to
reaffirm Newton’s distinction between absolute (or metaphysical) time and
relative (or physical) time. The latter is merely a sensible measure of the
former, and my suggestion is that cosmic time is a sensible measure of
God’s time since creation.
Such an affirmation will be typically met with passionate disclamations.
Such protestations strike me, however, as being for the most part miscon-
ceived. In our weighing this issue, two questions need to be kept distinct:
(i) Does cosmic time provide a sensible measure of God’s time? (ii) Is cos-
mic time in some sense absolute?
Cosmic Time as a Measure of God’s Time
The first question is scarcely ever addressed directly by theorists. But
very frequently assertions are made about the nature of cosmic time which
would seem to imply that cosmic time enjoys no special status that would
warrant us in identifying it as a sensible measure of God’s time, any more
than we should be warranted in picking out some arbitrary inertial frame
and identifying the time associated with it as privileged. The choice of cos-
mic time as a measure of God’s time could be said to be arbitrary because
nothing in GTR requires that we slice up spacetime in one way rather than
another. The theory allows one’s three-dimensional hyper-surfaces to dis-
sect spacetime in any arbitrary way, so that the selection of one foliation
over another is a conventional choice.27 Eddington graphically expressed
this point in drawing our attention to the difference between a pile of sheets
of paper and a solid paper block. “The solid block is the true analogy for
the four-dimensional combination of spacetime; it does not separate natu-
rally into a particular set of three-dimensional spaces piled in time order. It
can be redivided into such a pile; but it can be redivided in any direction we
please.”28 The implication would seem to be that the identification of our
cosmic time as the sensible measure of God’s time is wholly conventional.
But the shortcoming of this answer to our question is that such a
response is not based on the whole story. It is true that the General Theory
itself does not mandate a specific foliation of spacetime; but this is only to
consider the theory in abstracto, apart from any de facto boundary condi-
tions arising from the nature of material reality. The answer explicitly
ignores the notion of the evolution of the universe and considers just a
manifold of points. Once we introduce, however, considerations concern-
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ing the de facto distribution of matter and energy in the universe, then cer-
tain natural symmetries emerge which disclose to us the preferential folia-
tion of spacetime and the real cosmic time in distinction from artificial foli-
ations and contrived times.29 To return to Eddington’s analogy of the
paper block, suppose that only by foliating the block into a stack of sheets
do we discover that on each sheet is a drawing of a cartoon figure and that
by flipping through the sheets successively, we can see this figure, thus
animated, proceed to pursue some action. Any other slicing of the block
would result merely in a scrambled series of ink marks. In such a case, it
would be silly to insist that any arbitrary foliation is just as good as the foli-
ation which regards the block as a stack of sheets. But analogously, the
Robertson-Walker metric discloses to us the natural foliation of spacetime
for our universe. It would be disingenuous to insist that the universe is not
really expanding homogeneously and isotropically in approximation of the
Friedman model, that it does not really have a certain spacetime curvature,
density, and pressure, that it has not really been about 15 billion years since
the singularity, but that any arbitrary foliation and contrived time will
yield equally appropriate descriptions of the way the universe actually is
and evolves. Eddington realized this, of course, and we have seen that he
recognized the privileged status of our cosmic time, though he emphasized
that no experimental knowledge of it was as yet available. Today, howev-
er, the situation has considerably changed. Not only do we know that a
privileged cosmic time in which the universe evolves exists, but because
the earth is approximately at rest with respect to our galactic fundamental
particle, we also have a fair idea of what time it is!
It seems to me, therefore, that we have quite convincing grounds for
holding that cosmic time is, indeed, a privileged time. Its privileged status
is implied by the existence of a fundamental reference frame for light prop-
agation in line with modern cosmology and by the existence of the
microwave background radiation, which serves to demarcate a preferential
reference frame. Cosmic time is the time of the duration of the universe.
The lapse of cosmic time thus plausibly measures the lapse of God’s time,
and the “now” of God’s time coincides with the “now” of cosmic time.
Therefore, I conclude, in answer to our first question, that God’s time does
coincide with cosmic time.
The Absoluteness of Cosmic Time
That leads us on to our second question: is cosmic time in some sense
absolute? We have already had occasion to say something about this in
our answer to the previous question. Since cosmic time coincides with
God’s time since the moment of creation, it records, in effect, Newton’s
absolute time.30
But the suggestion that cosmic time is comparable to Newton’s absolute
time is likely to be met with heated resistance. Unfortunately, much of the
disagreement seems due simply to the failure to keep clearly in mind
Newton’s distinction between absolute and relative time. Virtually all the
objections involve showing that cosmic time is in some way relative time
and then concluding that it cannot therefore be absolute time — as if
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Newton had not himself distinguished the two! Of course, no physical
time is absolute time; that is true by definition. The pertinent question is
whether the relative time kept by the ideal clock of a fundamental observer
provides a measure of absolute time and so in that derivative sense can be
said to share its absoluteness. Most critics have failed to keep clear the
sense in which cosmic time can be said to be “absolute,” and have com-
pounded that failure by failing to appreciate the notion of the coincidence
of cosmic time with absolute time.
For example, it is frequently said that cosmic time does not represent a
return to Newtonian absolute time because cosmic time would not exist
independently of all physical events as would absolute time.31 But such an
objection only reminds us that cosmic time is physical time rather than
metaphysical time. One can reject cosmic time’s absoluteness in the sense
of “non-relational” without repudiating the absoluteness of cosmic time in
the sense that cosmic time represents the true time (in the Lorentz-Poincaré
sense) as opposed to the merely local time. The objection is impotent
against the claim that cosmic time and absolute time are presently coinci-
dent, though not identical. Because these times are not identical, cosmic
time need not share all the properties of absolute time, such as its allegedly
non-relational character, and yet its moments still coincide with the
moments of absolute time. In virtue of that coincidence, cosmic time may
be quite properly said to be absolute in the sense that it gives the true time.
Or again, it is frequently objected that cosmic time is contingent and
therefore cannot be regarded as absolute.32 But all that follows from the
existence of models lacking a cosmic time is that cosmic time contingently
coincides with absolute time. In virtue of that coincidence, it records the
true time in this world. Our world is characterized by cosmic time, and its
absence in other cosmological models is wholly irrelevant to whether it
coincides with God’s time in the actual world. The contingency of cosmic
time thus says nothing against its privileged status in this world; in fact, a
relationalist can consistently maintain that even metaphysical time exists
contingently, for if God had chosen to exist absolutely changelessly perma-
nently and never created a world, there would be no events at all and,
hence, not even metaphysical time. The existence of both metaphysical and
physical, cosmic time is thus a contingent fact dependent upon God’s will.
Finally, it is sometimes objected that cosmic time cannot be the basis for
the construction of an absolute Newtonian time because cosmic time is
observer-dependent in that it is defined in terms of hypothetical fundamen-
tal observers and is, hence, relativistic.33 But this objection merely trades on
the ambiguity of the expression “observer-dependent.” Co-ordinate cosmic
time does rely on the use of certain fundamental observers to establish ori-
gins of the co-moving co-ordinate system and in that sense can be said to be
observer-dependent. But the time so constructed is the same for all
observers, in whatever inertial frame they find themselves, and so is observ-
er-independent. Every observer, whatever his state of motion, will measure
events as occurring at the same values of cosmic time. Therefore, the funda-
mental observers are a privileged group of observers. The fact that cosmic
time is relative to a reference frame, namely, the fundamental frame, is not
incompatible with its coincidence with absolute time. Otherwise one might
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as well charge that the time of nineteenth century physics was not absolute
either, since it was relative to the aether rest frame! The point is that in both
cases, the reference frame in question is preferred and therefore the time
kept with respect to it measures absolute time.
One of the most intriguing indications that cosmic time is the physical
equivalent of Newtonian absolute time is the surprising demonstration by
E. A. Milne and W. H. McCrea that all the results of GTR-based, Friedman
cosmology can be recovered by Newtonian physics and in a way that is
simpler than Einstein’s cumbersome tensor calculus! Milne and McCrea
were able to reproduce all the results of Big Bang cosmology by means of a
material universe expanding in empty, classical space through classical
time.34 In particular the concept of cosmic time in GTR-based models corre-
sponds to absolute time in the Newtonian model.35 The history of the uni-
verse described by the variation of the scale factor R (t) in the Robertson-
Walker line element is identical in the two theories, even though in the one
the scale factor R(t) is determined by Einstein’s gravitational field equations,
while in the other only Newtonian absolute time and Euclidean geometry
come into play.36 The equivalence of Milne-McCrea Newtonian cosmology
with GTR-based, Friedman cosmology is a convincing demonstration that
cosmic time is, indeed, the physical equivalent of Newtonian absolute
time.37 Kerszberg concludes, “On the whole, the equivalence between
Newtonian and relativistic cosmology only reinforces the conviction that
cosmic time is indeed a necessary ingredient in the formalisation of a rela-
tivistic cosmology, however alien to general relativity and congenial to
Newton’s theory the notion of universal synchronisation might seem.”38
Conclusion
In conclusion, then, we have seen that when one moves from STR into
GTR, the application of the latter theory to cosmology yields a cosmic time,
which is plausibly regarded as being the physical time which measures
God’s absolute time and therefore registers to a good degree of approxima-
tion the true time.
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